#DrArvindKumarPresidentIndiaWaterFoundation
The present-day Central Asia comprises five countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the dissolution of erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991, these countries formed the part of Soviet Empire and were called Soviet Republics.
Central Asia is a dry and arid region with immensely diverse topography ranging from high mountains and glaciers to vast and dry steppes and deserts. The region is rich in water resources but more than 90 percent are concentrated in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The region’s two main rivers, Syr Darya and Amu Darya, originate in these two countries, while Uzbekistan, the single biggest consumer of water, and Turkmenistan, are located downstream. As much as 40 percent of the region’s water resources are concentrated solely in Kyrgyzstan.
Epic battles have been waged in Central Asia: between democracy and communism; capitalism and socialism; nomadic and sedentary cultures; Iranian and Turkic peoples; Muslim and Christian identities; indigenous and imperialistic forces. Legendary conquerors like Atilla the Hun, Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great and Timur etc. had swept across the Central Asian steps. Named as a ‘heartland’ of world for a long time in the past, the region commonly referred to as Central Asia stretches from the Caspian Sea on the West to the mountains of the east providing a natural border with China’s Xinjiang region and from its Northern border with Russia to its southern border with Afghanistan and Iran. It has a population of 56 million people living on approximately four million square kilometers.
In the aftermath of their catapult to independence in the wake of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the Central Asian Republics, aside from being under the spell of ongoing political changes brought about by independence, these countries also became involved in disputes among themselves in part due to their artificially created borders. Some of these disputes began during the years of Soviet rule. Aside from conflicts over resources, the ambitions of Russia, Iran, Turkey, and China have turned Central Asia into a highly conflict-prone region.
As a sequel to the Anglo-Russian rivalry at the end of the nineteenth century, the Central Asian region was divided into three parts. The eastern part went to China, the southern part came under British domination, and the rest–which today constitutes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan–was taken by Russia which, however, left the existing governmental and social system largely in place. In the early 1920s, following long resistance, the region was merged into the Soviet Union.
Causes of Crisis
The undemarcated geographical boundaries inherited by the Central Asian Republics in the post-Soviet era have created situations which today could become sources of conflict between and among the Republics. Some parts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are reachable only through the territory of Uzbekistan. The northern parts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are cut off from their southern parts most of the year. Uzbekistan has reportedly restricted the road transport going through its territory, apprehending infiltration by extremist elements.
In the immediate aftermath of gaining their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, all Central Asian countries were ill-prepared for this step, especially given their tightly integrated economies and dependence on joint infrastructure and common resources. Moreover, the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet empire brought competition among other powers for influence in the area. Realizing the new difficulties, particularly regarding water, these countries established the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, in 1992.
Inevitably, water is a key issue in Central Asia. Ninety percent of the water resources are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while the main consumers–Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan–can supply only 14 percent and 45 percent, respectively, of their water needs. Uzbekistan alone consumes more than half the region’s water resources. As a result, though, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control the water needed by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The upstream states view water as a commodity for trade and profit, especially since they are poorly endowed with other resources. Control over water is also important for them as they need it to generate much of their own power needs.
These differences can often be settled through negotiation but the relative leverage of the two sides shifts during the year. In summer, the downstream countries have less leverage given their high water needs, while in winter the consumer states have the advantage because they can cut off their coal and gas supplies or restrict transport on their roads. A large number of bilateral agreements have been signed to manage these issues.
Between 1997 and 2004, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan alone signed ten agreements and held a large number of meetings. Uzbekistan’s gas and Kyrgyzstan’s water are major bargaining chips in this relationship. In addition, Uzbekistan has some control over the supply of water to southern parts of Kazakhstan which at times it has reduced, triggering angry protests by Kazakh peasants, as well as high-level political dispute between the two countries.
The existing border disputes further exacerbate these problems. This is particularly true in the case of Uzbekistan, which has border disputes with all countries of the region. The most acute tensions exist between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over two enclaves that belong to the latter. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan also claim parts of each other’s territories. Numerous clashes have occurred on the Tajik-Uzbek and Kyrgyz-Uzbek borders, leading to the closing of frontiers and–especially by Uzbekistan–laying of minefields.
However, the results have not been satisfactory despite the signing of many water agreements. Leaders of the Republics are under constant domestic pressure–especially from farmers–to improve the terms of these arrangements. International factors also change the relative leverage of these Republics. The upstream countries are allies of Russia, while downstream countries pursue a policy of distancing themselves from Russia and its influence. Russian influence certainly gives an additional leverage to upstream countries.
In recent years, the downstream countries have undertaken a policy of energy self-sufficiency and reduced their dependency on imported hydropower from their neighbors. Upstream countries have pursued a policy of developing and utilizing their hydropower potential which has significantly reduced the water flows to downstream countries. The urban population of upstream countries is, to a large extent, dependent on the gas and coal supply from downstream countries, especially during winter. The downstream countries thus want water for cotton and can use their energy supplies to bargain for it; the upstream countries can bargain with their water but their energy strategy requires retaining more of it.
In this manner, the downstream and upstream countries are faced with different domestic pressures. Their interests are often diametrically opposed to each other and offer little flexibility in negotiating the terms of joint use of water resources. Uzbekistan could reduce its water needs by shifting away from cotton. However, cotton is such a big asset to generate revenue and foreign exchange that the government is unwilling to restructure its agriculture. Any fall in cotton income–which is heavily dependent on water supplies–would only further impoverish a rural population already in difficult straits.
It is noteworthy that the upstream countries are poorer, less powerful, and have few resources to develop. Water is one of the few assets Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess. Yet, if they face retaliatory cutbacks in gas supplies, their urban populations exert pressure on the governments for a more flexible water strategy. Giving up more water, however, undercuts their hydroelectric production which only makes them more vulnerable to energy blackmail from their downstream neighbors.
Remedial Measures
It is in the backdrop of all these factors that bilateral and multilateral water arrangements are constantly being renegotiated, a factor which only increases the importance, controversy and tension around this resource’s distribution. According to one opinion, the conflict of interest over water resources between the upstream and the downstream states is now addressed in an ad hoc manner, through annual bilateral negotiations involving compensations of the upstream states, in the form of coal, natural gas or electricity supplies by the downstream states. However, the implementation of these bilateral agreements is difficult, if not impossible…
On 17 March 1998 an agreement on the joint use of water and energy resources was reached in Bishkek between three countries–Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, which controls a significant part of water resources, was not initially invited, and it joined the agreement in June 1998. The agreement was primarily driven by the biggest consumer of water–Uzbekistan.
Intensification of tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was reported in 1997, involving a military build-up by Uzbekistan across from the water reservoir located close to its border on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. This move raised concerns and anger in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz government adopted a resolution declaring water as a tradable commodity, and codifying its right to use it for profit. It threatened to sell water to China if Uzbekistan failed to pay for it.
Viewed in a broad spectrum, the upstream countries have comparatively less leverage than the downstream countries. They have fewer resources and are dependent on downstream countries for their access to the world markets. Consequently, they cannot afford to build the hydroelectric stations that would make them more independent of the downstream states’ energy supplies. When upstream countries break agreements by withholding water, they derive no immediate benefit but suffer from a loss of road access and energy imports.
But if downstream states argue that their water supply is insufficient and try to increase it by violating agreements, those regimes actually increase their popularity since they are seen as battling against unacceptable conditions. Moreover, the military power of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is far greater than that of their upstream neighbours, letting them make credible threats of using force if they are not satisfied by water deals.
Downstream countries also have more leverage during the winter, when their upstream neighbors are dependent on them for energy supply and roads. Upstream countries in turn, have the advantage during the hot season, when crops in their downstream neighbors require more water.
The downstream countries were more flexible in their negotiations with Kyrgyzstan, which has a strategic advantage over Tajikistan, and they promised Kyrgyzstan financial contributions toward maintaining water facilities and the delivery of gas and coal without delay or stoppages.
Each of the upstream countries, being an ally of Russia, enjoys additional leverage in negotiations and puts pressure on downstream countries. Besides, international pressure on all countries to save the Aral Sea, in turn, gives additional leverage to downstream countries. International organizations provide financial assistance to these countries for producing alternative crops which require less water while pressuring upstream countries to discharge more water in order to ensure a sufficient level in the sea.
Conclusion
It is noteworthy that the process of negotiations commenced only when downstream countries realized that their leverages were no longer greater than those of upstream countries. The upstream countries threatened to use water as leverage. Mounting Russian influence has enabled upstream countries to ‘act more bravely.’ On the other hand, agreement is possible only when both sides can gain from an agreement. Energy supplies and access to infrastructure–leverages of downstream countries–overlapped with the use of water as a political too and the geopolitical balance, which favor upstream countries.
Water represents a major source of conflict in Central Asia. Tensions have been especially high over the past few years as the region has experienced the worst drought in over a century. Political games, unilateral bellicose actions by downstream countries, and “retaliations” by upstream countries, have marked the foreign policies of each country involved in the conflict.
On the contrary, agreements have been reached, usually under the heavy pressure of domestic and international factors, including geo-economic and geopolitical factors. However, seasonal variations and the complex nature of domestic politics and inter-state relations regarding water then lead to the breakdown of those agreements. Under these circumstances, it devolves on the international community to help Central Asian countries reach a permanent solution to tackle the water-related issues without external pressure or interference.
References
Anthony R. Bitchel, Mapping Central Asia, 1997, available at http://www.icarp.org/publications/pub-mapping.html, accessed on 12 September 2008.
Barnet Rubin, “Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and Consequences of the Civil War in Tajikistan,” in Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), Post-Soviet Political Order , London: Routledge, pp. 128-161.
Bea Hogan, “Central Asia States Wrangle over Water,” Eurasia News, April 2000, available online at: http://www.eurasianet.org.
Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia: Border Dispute Between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan Risks Triggering Conflict,” RFE/RL, March 8, 1999, http://www.rferl.org.
David Smith, “Environmental Security and Shared Water Resources in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” Post-Soviet Geography, 36(9), 1995, pp. 565-586.
Eric Miller, Old Dominion University Paper for the 13 Annual Graduate Student Symposium, University of Virginia, available at http://www.virginia.edu/~crees/symposium/miller.html, accessed on 12 September 2008.
Iskandar Abdullaev, “Preventing Conflicts through Water Management in Central Asia,” Transition Newsletter, June 2001.
Paul Goble and Bruce Pannier, “A Watershed in Central Asia,” Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 28 July 1997, http://www.rferl.org.
Roland Eggleston, “OSCE Seeks Agreement on Central Asian Water,” Eurasia News, June 2000;
Dr. Arvind Kumar (Article published in Third Concept|September 2008 Issue)
